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Sex & Immorality: The Court's Take
Early this year, the Supreme Court of New South Wales handed down its decision in
Ashton v Pratt.  This was an action by Ms Ashton to enforce a promise made by Richard
Pratt - director of Visy Industries and well known philanthropist.  The Court accepted
(though somewhat reluctantly it seems) that Mr Pratt had told Ms Ashton that he would
establish trusts of $2.5 million for each of her two children, pay her an allowance of
$500,000 per year, pay up to $36,000 per annum for rental accommodation for her, and
pay $30,000 per annum for her business expenses, particularly travel. [para 28].
In exchange, Ms Ashton agreed not to return to the escort industry, and provide services
(non-exclusively) to Mr Pratt as his mistress on occasions when he was in Sydney.
In spite of the Court finding that such a promise existed, it refused to uphold the
promise.  Others have commented on the decision - eg here and here - however what
interests me in particular is one basis for this refusal; that even if there were a contract,
the Court would not enforce it on grounds of public policy.  The question that springs to
my mind is why the law would still presume to find an apparently consensual sexual
relationship - for money or otherwise - immoral to such an extent that it fell foul of
'public policy'.
Arrangement Against Public Policy
Although the Court found there were insufficient indicia of a contract (ie the
arrangement lacked intention to create legal relations) Brereton J nonetheless turned his
mind to whether such an arrangement could theoretically be enforceable, or whether it
would be against public policy. The public policy in question was rendering void and
illegal, contracts that are 'sexually immoral and/or prejudicial to the status of marriage'.
Despite the defendant (Mr Pratt's executor) not making this argument, the Court felt
'bound to address the issue'. [para 37]
The Court first discussed a line of decisions on extra-marital cohabitation (which is
considered an immoral purpose at law). Many of these contracts were in fact upheld
because the parties were already cohabiting - therefore the contract did not bring about
this 'immoral' state.  In my view, this is an example of framing the facts to fit the law. In
terms of co-habitation generally, the Court pointed out that statute now recognised
unmarried cohabitation 'notwithstanding any rule of public policy to the contrary'.
The Court then turned its mind to the real issue, namely whether the arrangement was
for 'meretricious sexual services'.  In other words, did this contract tend to encourage
sexual immorality, therefore rendering it void as against public policy.
As with the cohabitation cases, the courts have upheld agreements where the sexual
immorality already existed: so the contract was not one that brought about sexual
immorality. Therefore it would not be void against public policy.
Brereton J acknowledged that social mores continue to change, but that 'as authority
stands such a contract remains contrary to public policy and illegal'. [para 50] It seems
that where the law has advanced lies in that 'a distinction is now drawn between
contracts with purely meretricious purposes and those which are intended to regulate
stable extra-marital relationships' [citing Treitel on Contracts, 390].
The relationship between Ms Ashton and Mr Pratt was not however such a 'stable'
relationship. The Court sought to characterise their relationship based on a helpful
classification from Markulin v Drew (1993, NSWSC, Young J, unreported):
It should be remembered, however, that traditionally there were in fact
three classes of cases: (i) a contract of cohabitation; (ii) a contract by a
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man with a woman to provide occasional sexual services; and (iii) an
agreement with a common prostitute. Cases such as Bainham v Manning
(1691) 23 ER 756 suggest that while relief would not be given to a man
against a bond he had given to a common strumpet or prostitute, equity
would not countenance a transaction whereby a man had given a bond to a
housekeeper to secure a sum of money to her if she provided "secret
services", presuming attending on her master for sex if required.
Accordingly, "meretricious" probably means not a contract with a prostitute,
but a contract treating a woman as if she were a prostitute.
In Ashton v Pratt, Brereton J found that the arrangements sought to establish a 'mistress
relationship', and that the evidence did not reveal a relationship or consideration beyond
'meretricious sexual services'. On this basis the arrangements were contrary to public
policy and illegal. [para 52]  The Court did not discuss the impact, if any, of the
arrangement on Mr Pratt's marriage, but only its meretriciousness.
Why this decision is unfortunate
Definition of Meretricious 1: of or relating to a prostitute: having the nature
of prostitution <meretricious relationships>...
Origin of Meretricious
Latin meretricius, from meretric-, meretrix prostitute, from merēre to
earn...
First Known Use: 1626
Though not called upon to do so by the parties' submissions, the Court chose to
characterise the parties' arrangement as 'meretricious'. The Court found itself bound by
the thinking prevalent in 1691, demonstrated by its approval of Markulin v Drew, citing
Bainham v Manning in spite of accepting that 'social mores have no doubt continued to
change' [para 50].
A feminist reading of this case might identify that the Court framed its inquiry around the
'social' and sexual (ie private) nature of the arrangement. In positioning Ms Ashton's claim
as private, it existed outside the law. This reveals how contract law privileges the
so-called objective, rational, autonomous public face of the market place - for it is these
arrangements that will be enforced by the law while others within the domestic or social
sphere will not.
The law reveals its gendered nature in presuming that a person will delineate their life in
a work/home dichotomy. In contrast, in the private sphere a person might see work and
family as mutually defining. This would however fall outside the consideration of the law.
In this way, the processes of contract law subtly privilege that which inhabits the public
domain to the exclusion of inhabits the private. (See Chapter 10 of my LLM thesis (2006)
here for more discussion on this.)
In categorising the nature of this contract so easily into one of 'establishing the
relationship of mistress' the Court makes a number of assumptions. First, it denies the
possibility that Mr Pratt might have been genuinely seeking to support Ms Ashton. While
this is likely impossible to prove now that Mr Pratt is deceased, the evidence accepted by
the Court seems to indicate that he felt tenderness towards her an obligation (a moral
obligation?) to support her and her children. This represents a rejection of the domestic
and the personal in the Court's considerations. In finding the arrangement immoral, is it
possible that the Court may instead have breached Mr Pratt's own perceived moral
obligation?
More importantly perhaps as a representation of that which is public, the Court
effectively privileged what it assumed to be Mr Pratt's view of the arrangement without
consideration of Ms Ashton's own view of what the arrangement might represent.
It is clear from Ms Ashton's testimony, and indeed the nature of the arrangement - which
included a $2.5 million trust settlement on each of her children - that Ms Ashton was
concerned for the financial future of both her and her two children. In my view, for Ms
Ashton this arrangement represented security for her family. This was nowhere
considered by the Court in assessing the validity or otherwise of the arrangement.
Instead, it chooses to find it meretricious and in doing so, brands Ms Ashton as an
immoral woman and ignores any stated wishes (or moral obligation) of Mr Pratt in
offering to provide.
While the Court's labelling of this arrangement as meretricious in one sense reflects
on both parties, it is really Ms Ashton who suffers the taint of court-declared
immorality. It is she, after all, who is the one receiving money for the granting of
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sexual services where the context for this arrangement was excluded from the
Court's consideration. Mr Pratt on the other hand lived a high-profile life and
enjoyed both respect and notoriety. His 'extraordinary wealth' [para 23] and his
power means that regardless of such a finding, even in death he will continue to
enjoy a high reputation.
In purporting to safeguard 'public policy' as to morality, the Court in this case has instead
represented an archaic and therefore unsustainable approach to adjudication of
contractual disputes. It has done so first in applying the entrenched public/private
dichotomy that privileges the world of rational, documented, considered and objective
commerce, while suppressing the domestic and lived experience of those who appear
before it. In doing so, it effectively taints a woman and protects the estate of a man who
had the capacity to honour the arrangement.
Secondly, it has insisted on the bindingness of ancient standards of morality, failing to
take the opportunity to bring the law into the present and provide for the future.
Contrast the Court's approach in Mabo:
If a postulated rule of the common law expressed in earlier cases seriously
offends those contemporary values, the question arises whether the rule
should be maintained and applied. Whenever such a question arises, it is
necessary to assess whether the particular rule is an essential doctrine of
our legal system and whether, if the rule were to be overturned, the
disturbance to be apprehended would be disproportionate to the benefit
flowing from the overturning. [para 29]
In my respectful opinion, if the Court felt bound to consider the issue of public policy on
the basis of immorality, it should instead have posed the question of whether the rule
should be maintained, and on what basis.  Instead it has reinforced the capacity of the
courts to define people - usually women - such as Ms Ashton as immoral based upon an
arrangement for consensual sex.
One could ask then, what exactly is the public policy being upheld, who is affected by
such an approach, and how does it relate to a contemporary Australian understanding of
morality?
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